The Brewers Who Lost Everything: What Prohibition Teaches About Regulatory Takings When America banned alcohol, brewery owners lost millions. The Supreme Court said they were entitled to nothing. Today | How to buy Skittles Moonrock online

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The first in a series of 4 articles by RN Collins about legal issues, concepts and hemp

Yes historical context- imagine that!

The Brewers Who Lost Everything: What Prohibition Teaches About Regulatory Takings

When America banned alcohol, brewery owners lost millions. The Supreme Court said they were entitled to nothing. Today’s hemp industry faces the same precedent.

Part 1 of 4: Historical Foundation

In 1877, Peter Mugler made what seemed like a sound business decision. He invested $10,000—approximately $250,000 in today’s dollars—to construct a state-of-the-art brewery in Salina, Kansas. The facility was “specially constructed and adapted for use in the manufacture of … beer,” with equipment, layout, and infrastructure purpose-built for brewing operations.[1] For four years, Mugler’s business thrived in a completely legal industry.

Then Kansas changed the rules.

On November 2, 1880, Kansas voters ratified a constitutional amendment declaring: “The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors shall be forever prohibited in this state, except for medical, scientific, and mechanical purposes.”[2] The implementing statute, effective May 1, 1881, made it a misdemeanor to “manufacture, sell, or barter any spirituous, malt, vinous, fermented, or other intoxicating liquors.”[3]

Overnight, Mugler’s $10,000 brewery became “not worth to exceed the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars for any other purpose”—a 75% loss in value.[4] The building still stood, its equipment intact. But it could no longer be used for the only purpose for which it had been designed.

Mugler continued brewing anyway. He was arrested, convicted, and fined $100.[5]

Then he sued, arguing Kansas had unconstitutionally “taken” his property without just compensation, violating the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”[6]

In 1887, the Supreme Court ruled against him in a decision that would control prohibition law for the next century—and that controls the fate of hemp businesses today.[7]

The Police Power Trump Card

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice John Marshall Harlan delivered an opinion that established the foundational framework for all regulatory takings challenges involving prohibition of harmful activities:

“A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.”[8]

The Court’s reasoning established several principles that remain binding today:

First, the police power permits prohibition without compensation. The government possesses inherent authority—never explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but “consistently with the existence and safety of organized society”—to protect public health, safety, and morals.[9] When exercising that power, the state need not compensate affected property owners for their economic losses.

Second, prior lawfulness creates no vested right. The fact that Mugler’s brewery was entirely legal when constructed was irrelevant. “[The State] did not thereby give any assurance, or come under an obligation, that its legislation upon that subject would remain unchanged.”[10] Businesses operate subject to the government’s ongoing authority to prohibit activities it deems harmful.

Third, substantial financial loss doesn’t trigger compensation. Mugler’s 75% loss in property value changed nothing. “The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not—and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be—burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses.”[11]

Fourth, purpose-built facilities receive no special protection. That Mugler’s brewery had “little value if not used for the purpose of manufacturing beer” did not create a constitutional right to continue brewing.[12] The property’s specialized nature was simply “an incident of the peculiar nature of the property” and the owner’s problem.[13]

The brewery building still belonged to Mugler. He retained title, possession, and the right to sell it or use it for other purposes. But he could not use it to manufacture beer. In the Court’s analysis, this wasn’t a “taking” of property—it was a valid prohibition of harmful conduct.

When Federal Prohibition Arrived: The Ruppert Case

When the prohibition movement went national, brewers renewed constitutional challenges with additional arguments. All failed.

The War-Time Prohibition Act (1918)

Before the Eighteenth Amendment even took effect, Congress banned alcohol through ordinary legislation. The War-Time Prohibition Act of November 21, 1918, prohibited the manufacture of beer containing more than one-half of one percent alcohol and prohibited the sale of all intoxicating liquors effective June 30, 1919.[14]

Jacob Ruppert, who owned a brewery in New York, had manufactured beer containing 2.75% alcohol by weight under explicit permission from President Woodrow Wilson pursuant to wartime food conservation regulations.[15] When the War-Time Prohibition Act passed, Ruppert’s authorization was revoked, his product became illegal, and his business faced ruin.

Critically, this prohibition occurred before the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified on January 16, 1920.[16] Ruppert challenged the statutory prohibition, arguing:

• He had manufactured beer under explicit governmental permission
• The immediate effective date provided no transition period
• His inventory of lawful beer was rendered worthless overnight
• The Act exceeded Congressional war powers
• He was entitled to compensation for his brewery’s destroyed value and unsalable inventory[17]

The Supreme Court’s Response

In Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey (1920), Justice Louis Brandeis, writing for the Court, systematically rejected each argument.[18]

On Congressional authority: The Court held Congress possessed implied constitutional power under its war powers to prohibit alcohol manufacture and sale to conserve food resources and maintain military efficiency, stating: “Since Congress has power to increase war efficiency by prohibiting the liquor traffic, no reason appears why it should be denied the power to make its prohibition effective.”[19]

On the compensation claim: The Court directly applied Mugler, holding that “the loss resulting to the plaintiff from inability to use the property for brewery purposes, is an incident of the peculiar nature of the property” and the regulatory need.[20] No compensation was required.

On the immediate effective date: The Court rejected arguments that brewers needed transition time, holding: “Hardship resulting from making an act take effect upon its passage is a frequent incident of permissible legislation; but whether it shall be imposed rests wholly in the discretion of the lawmaking body.”[21] Congress could eliminate an industry overnight without constitutional violation.

On inventory losses: Even beer lawfully manufactured before the Act’s passage received no protection. The prohibition applied immediately to possession and sale, rendering existing inventory worthless. The Court held this did not constitute a taking requiring compensation.[22]

On prior governmental permission: That Ruppert manufactured under express Presidential authorization was irrelevant. “The specific permission from the President to manufacture 2.75 per cent. beer was not on the ground that such beer was nonintoxicating; nor was it a declaration by him that this beer was in fact nonintoxicating.”[23] Permission could be withdrawn at any time without compensation.

Justice McReynolds dissented, joined by Justices Day and Van Devanter, arguing the prohibition was unconstitutional because “active hostilities have ended and demobilization has been completed.”[24] But even the dissent did not contest that Congress could prohibit alcohol under appropriate circumstances—only that the war emergency no longer justified it.

The constitutional power to ban without compensation was not in dispute.

Post-Amendment Reaffirmation: Everard’s Breweries

After the Eighteenth Amendment took effect on January 16, 1920, brewers mounted one final challenge, this time attacking restrictions on medicinal use of alcohol.

The Supplemental Prohibition Act (1921)

The National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act) initially allowed physicians to prescribe intoxicating liquors—including beer and other malt liquors—for medicinal purposes.[25] Breweries like James Everard’s Breweries obtained permits to manufacture “intoxicating malt liquor for medicinal purposes, and stout for sale to pharmacists for resale on physician’s prescriptions.”[26]

Then Congress changed course. The Supplemental Prohibition Act of November 23, 1921, prohibited physicians from prescribing malt liquors entirely, providing: “only spirituous and vinous liquor may be prescribed for medicinal purposes, and all permits to prescribe and prescriptions for any other liquor shall be void.”[27]

When the Act passed, Everard had “on hand a large quantity of these intoxicating malt liquors which it could not thereafter sell in the conduct of its business, and of which it could only dispose, after de-alcoholization, at a heavy loss.”[28]

Everard sued, arguing:

• The Eighteenth Amendment only authorized prohibition for “beverage purposes”
• Medicinal use is not beverage consumption
• The company had obtained federal permits in good faith
• It manufactured product specifically for the permitted medicinal market
• Complete prohibition of medicinal sales exceeded Congressional authority
• Compensation was required for inventory and lost business value[29]

Arbitrary Distinctions Upheld

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Sanford, rejected all arguments and upheld the prohibition.[30]

On Congressional discretion under the Eighteenth Amendment: “Congress, under its express power to enforce by appropriate legislation the prohibition of traffic in intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes … may adopt any eligible and appropriate means to make that prohibition effective.”[31]

On judicial review limitations: The Court held that courts lack authority to second-guess Congressional judgments about enforcement necessity:

“Where the means adopted by Congress are not prohibited and are calculated to effect the object intrusted to it, this Court may not inquire into the degree of their necessity; as this would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread upon legislative ground.”[32]

On the medicinal exception: Congress had determined, based on testimony from over 100 physicians and extensive committee hearings, that malt liquors possessed “no substantial and essential medicinal properties which made it necessary that their use for medicinal purposes should be permitted.”[33] Courts would not second-guess this factual finding.

On the arbitrary distinction: Here’s the critical holding for current hemp debates. Congress permitted prescription of spirits and wine but prohibited malt liquors for identical medicinal purposes. Brewers argued this distinction was medically arbitrary.

The Court disagreed: “The distinction made by Congress between permitting the prescription of spirituous and vinous liquors while prohibiting the prescription of malt liquors, is not plainly unreasonable or without a substantial justification, based upon their essential differences.”[34]

Translation: Legislative distinctions between different intoxicating substances receive extreme deference, even when seemingly arbitrary.

On compensation for inventory: “It cannot be said that [Congressional] action in this respect violated any personal rights of the appellants protected by the Constitution. That it did not take their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, is clear.”[35]

The Uniform Pattern

Across three Supreme Court cases, multiple dissents, and shifting factual circumstances, the holdings were unanimous on the compensation question:

What brewery owners lost:

• Purpose-built facilities worth millions
• Inventory rendered worthless
• Established customer bases -Going-concern business value
• Permits and licenses obtained in good faith
• Investments made when business was legal

What brewery owners received:

• Nothing
• Zero compensation
• No transition payments
• No inventory buy-backs
• No business loss recovery
• Not one cent

The legal principle: When government prohibits activities under its police power to protect public health, safety, or morals, property owners bear the entire cost of regulatory change. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides no remedy.

Why the Doctrine Made Sense (To the Court)

The Supreme Court’s reasoning wasn’t arbitrary or unprincipled. The Justices genuinely believed the rule was necessary for functional government.

Justice Harlan explained in Mugler: If government had to compensate everyone affected by health and safety regulations, “the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappear[ed].”[36]

The concern was straightforward: If every safety regulation triggered compensation, government couldn’t afford to govern. Consider the implications:

• Prohibit lead paint? Compensate paint manufacturers.
• Ban asbestos? Pay asbestos companies for lost profits.
• Restrict tobacco advertising? Compensate tobacco companies.
• Prohibit unsafe drugs? Pay pharmaceutical companies.
• Close unsafe factories? Compensate factory owners.

The parade of horribles was endless. Some limitations on property use must be permissible without compensation, or government would be paralyzed.

The line the Court drew: Physical seizures and arbitrary restrictions require compensation. But prohibitions of genuinely harmful activities do not, even when they destroy business value.

The question courts don’t ask: What happens when the “harm” is pretextual and the real motive is protecting powerful incumbents? More on this in Article 4.

State Court Application: The Pattern Holds

While this article focuses on Supreme Court precedent, the research identified 251 state court cases addressing Prohibition-era takings and compensation claims between 1919 and 1934.[37]

Though comprehensive review of all 251 cases was not completed, sampling reveals a uniform pattern: State courts consistently applied Mugler and rejected compensation claims. Representative examples include:

• License revocations upheld without compensation
• Seizure and destruction of inventory permitted
• Closure of saloons and taverns sustained
• No recovery for purpose-built facilities
• Criminal penalties for continued operations affirmed

The doctrinal consistency across jurisdictions is remarkable. Federal and state courts, across different time periods and varying factual circumstances, reached identical conclusions: The police power permits prohibition without compensation.

Modern Preservation of the Doctrine

One might assume this harsh 19th-century doctrine has been overruled or limited by modern constitutional jurisprudence. It has not.

Penn Central’s Explicit Preservation (1978)

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Supreme Court established the modern three-factor test for regulatory takings: (1) economic impact; (2) interference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) character of governmental action.[38]

But Penn Central explicitly preserved the police power exception. The Court emphasized that “in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that ‘the health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests.”[39]

The Court specifically cited Mugler and noted such restrictions have been upheld “even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the property.”[40]

Lucas’s “Background Principles” Exception (1992)

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council created a categorical rule: regulations that “den[y] all economically beneficial or productive use of land” constitute per se takings requiring compensation.[41]

However, Lucas included a critical exception that preserved the police power doctrine:

“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use … it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”[42]

The Court explained that regulations eliminating uses “always unlawful” under background principles of nuisance and property law require no compensation:

“[T]he proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with…. [A] law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts—by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.”[43]

Application to drug prohibition: The Court provided examples directly relevant to controlled substance regulation, noting that property owners would not be entitled to compensation when prohibited from uses that threaten public health or safety, “even to the extent of … destruction” of property value.[44]

Palazzolo and Regulatory Notice (2001)

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island addressed whether property acquired after regulations are enacted can support takings claims.[45] The Court held post-regulation purchasers are not automatically barred, but “the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations.”[46]

This framework significantly affects hemp businesses that entered the market after the 2018 Farm Bill, as discussed in Article 3 of this series.

The Takings That Never Were: What Brewers Actually Lost

To understand the stakes for modern hemp businesses, it’s worth examining the concrete losses Prohibition inflicted on alcohol industry participants:

Physical Property Losses

Breweries and distilleries: Specialized facilities with limited alternative uses. The Mugler brewery, valued at $10,000 for brewing, was worth only $2,500 for other purposes—a loss of $7,500 (75%).[47] Larger commercial breweries faced proportionally greater losses.

Saloons and bars: Retail establishments with fixtures, furnishings, and improvements specific to alcohol service. Many had no viable alternative commercial use.

Warehouses and storage facilities: Temperature-controlled facilities designed for aging and storing alcohol products.

Inventory Losses

Manufactured product: Beer, whiskey, wine, and other products already produced but unsold. Ruppert involved “a large quantity of … beer” rendered worthless when prohibition took effect.[48] No buy-back programs existed. Inventory was simply forfeited.

Aging stock: Distilled spirits requiring years of aging represented especially significant losses. Whiskey distillers lost not just current inventory but years of future production already in barrels.

Raw materials: Hops, barley, grains, and other ingredients purchased for brewing became stranded assets.

Intangible Property Losses

Going-concern business value: Established customer relationships, brand equity, distribution networks, and operational systems had substantial value that evaporated overnight.

Licenses and permits: Many states required expensive licenses to manufacture or sell alcohol. These became worthless paper. No refunds were provided.

Goodwill: Business reputation and market position, often built over decades, was destroyed.

No Compensation Category Existed

The Supreme Court’s holdings in Mugler, Ruppert, and Everard’s Breweries made clear that none of these losses triggered Fifth Amendment compensation requirements:

• ✗ No compensation for purpose-built facilities
• ✗ No compensation for inventory
• ✗ No compensation for lost business value
• ✗ No compensation for licenses and permits
• ✗ No compensation for goodwill
• ✗ No compensation for raw materials
• ✗ No compensation for any loss category

The Doctrinal Foundation: Why Courts Say This Isn’t a “Taking”

Understanding why the Court reached these conclusions requires examining the distinction between takings and regulations.

What IS a Taking (Compensation Required)

Physical appropriations: When government takes title to property or physically occupies it for public use, compensation is required.[49]

Examples:

• Eminent domain for highway construction
• Government flooding of private land for dam project
• Military occupation of private property
• Even minimal permanent physical invasions[50]

Total regulatory wipeouts (for arbitrary reasons): When regulation eliminates all economic value without legitimate public purpose, compensation may be required.[51]

Example:

• Prohibiting all development on land for purely aesthetic preferences unrelated to nuisance
• Arbitrary singling out of individual parcels

What is NOT a Taking (No Compensation Required)

Police power regulations: When government prohibits uses that threaten public health, safety, morals, or welfare, no compensation is required even if:

• The prohibition eliminates the property’s most valuable use
• The owner made substantial investments
• The use was previously lawful
• Purpose-built facilities become nearly worthless[52]

Examples from Supreme Court cases:

• Prohibiting alcohol manufacturing (Mugler)
• Prohibiting brickyard operations in residential areas (Hadacheck v. Sebastian)[53]
• Prohibiting sand and gravel mining (Goldblatt v. Hempstead)[54]
• Requiring destruction of diseased cedar trees (Miller v. Schoene)[55]

The Critical Distinction

The constitutional line turns on whether government is seizing property for its own use or prohibiting harmful private use:

Seizing for government use = Taking

• Building highway through your land
• Flooding your property for reservoir
• Occupying your building for government offices
• Rationale: Government gets the benefit; owner should get compensation

Prohibiting harmful use = Police Power

• Banning your dangerous product
• Closing your unsafe facility
• Prohibiting your polluting activity
• Rationale: Society gets the benefit (harm prevention); owner bears loss as incident of preventing harm to others

Alcohol prohibition fell into the second category. So does hemp prohibition.

What Happened to the Brewers: Individual Stories

Behind the legal doctrine were real people who lost real businesses.

Anheuser-Busch

The nation’s largest brewer, Anheuser-Busch, survived Prohibition by pivoting to:

• “Near beer” (< 0.5% alcohol)
• Soft drinks (including Bevo, a failed malt beverage)
• Yeast production
• Ice cream
• Truck bodies and car parts[56]

The company survived but was diminished. No compensation for the lost beer business.

Pabst Brewing Company

Pabst similarly pivoted to cheese production and non-alcoholic beverages. The company nearly collapsed and was sold during Prohibition.[57]

Smaller Breweries

Most smaller breweries simply closed. They lacked resources to pivot to alternative products or wait out Prohibition’s thirteen-year duration. Owners lost their investments entirely.

Saloon Owners

Retail establishments faced even worse prospects. Unlike breweries, which could sometimes repurpose facilities for other manufacturing, saloons typically had no alternative use. Many buildings were simply abandoned.

The Human Cost

While economic losses are documented, the human cost is harder to quantify:

• Families whose multi-generational businesses were eliminated
• Workers who lost jobs (brewing industry employed tens of thousands)
• Communities built around breweries that collapsed
• Immigrants who had invested life savings in saloons

None received compensation. The Fifth Amendment, according to the Supreme Court, required none.

Application to Modern Hemp Industry

The parallel to today’s hemp industry is direct and disturbing.

Similar Investment Patterns

Like Prohibition-era brewers, modern hemp businesses:

• Made substantial capital investments in specialized facilities
• Purchased equipment purpose-built for specific product manufacturing
• Obtained federal and state permits in good faith
• Operated in explicit compliance with regulatory frameworks
• Built inventory, supply chains, and customer bases
• Invested when the activity was federally legal

Similar Regulatory Reversal

Like the transition from legal brewing to Prohibition:

• Hemp businesses operate under explicit federal authorization (2018 Farm Bill)
• Proposed legislation would prohibit most intoxicating hemp products
• Transition period (one year) is short relative to investment timescales
• Inventory would become illegal to sell
• Specialized facilities would lose most value
• Business models would become unlawful

Similar Constitutional Arguments Available

Hemp businesses could raise the same arguments brewers raised:

• “We invested in reliance on federal legalization”
• “We obtained permits demonstrating good faith compliance”
• “The restriction is arbitrary—alcohol remains legal”
• “Our property retains little value for alternative uses”
• “We deserve compensation for destroyed business value”

Same Precedent Controls

But hemp businesses face the same Supreme Court precedent that defeated brewers:

• Mugler: Prior lawfulness creates no vested right; police power permits prohibition without compensation
• Ruppert: Governmental permission creates no immunity from subsequent prohibition; immediate effective dates permissible
• Everard’s: Arbitrary distinctions between similar intoxicants upheld; courts defer to legislative judgments

The legal conclusion is nearly inescapable: Takings claims by hemp businesses would face the same fate as Prohibition-era brewery claims. Universal rejection.

Why This Matters Now

As of November 10, 2025, President Trump stated he “supports” proposed hemp ban language in Senate appropriations legislation.[58] The ban would:

• Limit total THC (including delta-8, THCa, all isomers) to 0.3%
• Ban “intermediate hemp-derived cannabinoid products” sold as final products
• Restrict legal hemp products to maximum 0.4 milligrams total THC per container
• Take effect within one year of passage[59]

Industry estimates suggest this would eliminate 60-80% of the current hemp market.

For businesses facing this threat, the Prohibition precedent delivers a harsh message: You’re on your own. The Constitution won’t save you. Politics might.

The remaining articles in this series examine:

• Article 2: Why no constitutional amendment is required (Congress can ban hemp through ordinary legislation)
• Article 3: What hemp businesses can actually do (spoiler: focus on politics, not takings litigation)
• Article 4: How the alcohol industry is driving the ban (regulatory capture in real time)

REFERENCES

[1] Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 624 (1887).

[2] KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 10 (1880) (repealed 1948); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624.

[3] 1881 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 128, § 1; Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624.

[4] Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624.

[5] Id.

[6] U.S. CONST. amend. V.

[7] Mugler, 123 U.S. 623.

[8] Id. at 668-69.

[9] Id. at 669.

[10] Id.

[11] Id. at 668-69.

[12] Id. at 664.

[13] Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 302 (1920).

[14] War-Time Prohibition Act, ch. 212, 40 Stat. 1046 (1918).

[15] Ruppert, 251 U.S. at 280-81.

[16] U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (ratified Jan. 16, 1920; repealed Dec. 5, 1933).

[17] Ruppert, 251 U.S. at 281.

[18] Id. at 264.

[19] Id. at 296.

[20] Id. at 302.

[21] Id. at 301-02.

[22] Id. at 302.

[23] Id. at 304.

[24] Id. at 304-10 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).

[25] National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919).

[26] James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 556 (1924).

[27] Supplemental Prohibition Act, ch. 134, § 2, 42 Stat. 222 (1921).

[28] Everard’s Breweries, 265 U.S. at 556.

[29] Id. at 556-58.

[30] Id. at 545.

[31] Id. at 560.

[32] Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[33] Id. at 562.

[34] Id. at 563.

[35] Id.

[36] Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.

[37] Westlaw search: (brewery OR saloon OR liquor OR alcohol) /s (compensation OR “just compensation” OR taking) AND prohibition AND DA(aft 1/1/1919 & bef 12/31/1934) (returning 251 results).

[38] Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

[39] Id. at 125.

[40] Id. at 125-26 & n.30.

[41] Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).

[42] Id. at 1027.

[43] Id. at 1027, 1029.

[44] See id. at 1030; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928).

[45] Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).

[46] Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

[47] Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624.

[48] Ruppert, 251 U.S. at 281.

[49] See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).

[50] See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).

[51] See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.

[52] See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.

[53] Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).

[54] Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).

[55] Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).

[56] These historical details about Anheuser-Busch and Pabst are based on company histories and historical records, not legal case law.

[57] Id.

[58] Julie Tsirkin, Trump ‘Supports’ Hemp THC Ban That’s Advancing In Senate, White House Says, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Nov. 10, 2025), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/trump-supports-hemp-thc-ban.

[59] Id.

READ THE SERIES:

• Article 1: The Brewers Who Lost Everything (Historical Foundation) ← You are here
• Article 2: The Amendment That Wasn’t Necessary (Constitutional Authority)
• Article 3: What Hemp Businesses Can Actually Do (Strategic Playbook)
• Article 4: Big Alcohol’s Regulatory Capture (Current Politics)

About this series: This analysis is based on comprehensive legal research examining Supreme Court precedent from 1887 to 2001, including review of six controlling cases and identification of 251 state court decisions, 19 federal hemp cases, and 3,528 law review articles. The complete legal memorandum with full Bluebook citations is available upon request.

About the Author

⚖️ Legal Interests
– Intellectual property transactions and technology transfer
– Fashion, branding, and luxury goods law
– Corporate and international tax law
– FDA regulation, compliance, and health product oversight
– Complex litigation and eDiscovery, including product liability and toxic tort defense related to pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and therapeutic technologies

I’m an incoming 1L at Northeastern University School of Law (Class of 2029), enrolled in the part-time, online FlexJD program designed for working professionals. Based in Honolulu, Hawai‘i, I chose the FlexJD format to pursue a legal career while continuing to support my family and remain rooted in my existing professional and personal commitments.

With a background in STEM, medical education, and academic program development, I bring experience translating complex scientific material into accessible content, designing interdisciplinary curricula, and supporting compliance in health and education settings. I’ve built and taught programs across diverse learning environments—including with international teams and multilingual learners—perspectives that now shape my approach to legal study.

Learn more & contact RN Collins at her Linked In

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